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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Marktverhalten und Endogenes Lobbying:  Empirische Evidenz für die 
Mobilfunkindustrie der USA 
Im diesem Beitrag wird der Zusammenhang zwischen dem Unternehmensverhalten in 
einem regulierten Produktmarkt und Lobbying-Aktivitäten empirisch untersucht. 
Insbesondere analysieren wir, ob die für Wahlkampagnezwecke ausgegebenen 
Parteispenden von US-amerikanischen Mobilfunkunternehmen Ende der achtziger Jahre 
einen Einfluss auf das Markverhalten hatten. Wir schätzen ein strukturiertes 
Produktmarktmodell unter Berücksichtigung der potentiellen Endogenität der 
Lobbying-Aktivitäten. Unsere Analyse zeigt, dass der Produktmarktwettbewerb in 
denjenigen U.S. Staaten intensiver war, in denen die Mobilfunkunternehmen höhere 
Parteispenden leisteten. Des Weiteren wird die Hypothese, dass die Lobbying-
Aktivitäten exogen gegenüber dem Marktverhalten sind, statistisch abgelehnt. 
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1 Introduction
Industrial economists have traditionally concentrated on the study of product market
behavior, while abstracting from activities that firms undertake to favorably influence
their business environment. Many product markets are, however, subject to governmental
intervention. Therefore, individual companies or the industry as a whole have an interest
to interfere in the policy making process. One way to achieve political influence is to
invest money and resources in order to get the attention of politicians and regulators,
gain their goodwill, and inform them about issues at stake. The extent to which firms
coordinate such lobbying activities to maximize the benefit of the whole industry is likely
to alter their willingness to abide by collusive agreements in the product market. Hence,
ignoring lobbying might bias our assessment of competition.
This paper empirically explores the relationship between market behavior and lobbying
activities in a regulated market. In particular, we investigate how the amount of firms’
contributions to political parties influences their product market conduct. Furthermore,
we test whether lobbying decisions are endogenous with respect to market strategies.
Our analysis employs data from the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry during
its early development phase in the second half of the 1980’s. Being divided into many
small geographical markets, which are exposed to varying forms of state specific price
regulation, this industry is uniquely suited for investigating the interrelation between
market outcomes and the political arena.
Lobbying eﬀorts encompass a variety of firms’ strategies, many of which are diﬃcult
to quantify and often unobservable. In the United States, political campaign contribu-
tions by individual companies and industrial interest groups are widespread and have the
advantage of being publicly disclosed. Therefore, we apply campaign contributions as a
measure for lobbying and interpret them as a way cellular operators acquire access to
politicians.1 In return for the campaign financing politicians may adjust price regulation
rules and exert influence on the composition and activities of the regulatory body, the
1Ansolabehre et.al. (2002) find a strong positive association between expenses by registered lobbyists
and PAC (Public Action Committee) contributions.
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Public Utility Commission (PUC). However, there exist other aspects of governmental
intervention, such as restrictions on the placement of cellular antennas, which give a ra-
tionale for rent seeking activities in this industry and are equally consistent with our
analysis. We abstract from attempts to influence entry regulation, because the market
structure of the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry was settled at the federal level
on a long-run basis before the sample period.2
Our empirical model of the cellular industry follows a structural approach, where
firms’ market conduct is estimated by specifying market demand and the industry supply
derived in a Cournot game. We then explore the influence campaign contributions have
on the estimated conjectural variations parameter. The potential endogeneity of lobbying
is accounted for in a descriptive way rather than by estimating a lobbying supply function.
Thereby we avoid untestable assumptions about the complex underlying economic model
of the lobbying process.
This paper yields two empirical results: First, we find evidence that product market
strategies and lobbying activities are indeed simultaneous and interdependent decisions.
Hence, firms’ attempt to influence their business environment should not be ignored when
studying market behavior in the early U.S. cellular industry. Second, our estimations
reveal a negative and significant impact of endogenized campaign contributions on firms’
conduct: high contributions tend to destabilize collusion.
Our interpretation of the negative link between lobbying expenditures and collusion
is based on the theoretical literature concerning the relationship between coordination
of firms in diﬀerent dimensions on the one hand, and, on the other, on how lobbying
coordination aﬀects actual lobbying expenditures. Applying the theory of multimarket
contact (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990) to the interrelation between coordination in
the product market and in lobbying, we expect that any individual deviation from the
collectively optimal lobbying contributions would not only be punished by returning to the
one-shot political equilibrium, but also by abandoning cooperation in the product market.
2For a rent seeking analysis of the licensing process in the U.S. cellular industry see Hazlett and
Michaels (1993).
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Thus, as long as market cooperation itself is sustainable, it might help to deter defection
in the lobbying game. This argument implies a positive relationship between product
market collusion and coordination in lobbying formation. Ludema (2001) qualifies the
multimarket argument by showing that, in cases where defection in individual lobbying
contributions are observed significantly lagged, collectively optimal lobbying eﬀorts for
public-good type regulation may actually destabilize market cooperation.3
The second theoretical aspect which is important for the interpretation of our find-
ing addresses the relationship between coordination in the political market and actual
lobbying expenditures. The political economy literature has analyzed this point diﬀeren-
tiating two cases. If lobbying is for a pure public good, an increase in coordination among
firms leads to higher contributions. When, in contrast, a specific type of regulation hurts
some firms while benefiting others, lobbying is aimed at acquiring a private good. In this
case, improved coordination between competing interests diminishes aggregated lobbying
eﬀorts.4
In light of this literature the negative impact of lobbying expenditures has two possible
interpretations: Either, if cooperation at diﬀerent levels of firms’ activities are comple-
mentary, the policy decisions are considered to be a private good among the firms of
the cellular industry. Or, when lagged observability of defection in the lobbying process
results in cooperation at both levels being substitutes, policy is a public good. The latter
interpretation hinges, however, on the informational lag being suﬃciently large.
The empirical point of this paper, that the degree of product market competition
3The reason for this is that the profit increase due to a favorable policy is greater for those agents
who deviate from coordination in the political market, because the others bear the cost of lobbying and
cannot react immediately to defection in lobbying. Ludemas paper diﬀers from (Bernheim and Whinston
1990) in that he adjusts the model to the analysis of the connection between lobbying and the product
market, where the coordination in one market (lobbying) alters the gains from collusion in the other (the
product market). The potential negative association between coordination in the two dimensions relies,
however, on the observability lag.
4A general insight from the rent seeking literature is that total lobbying expenditures increase with
the number of competing individuals or groups (see Nitzan, 1994). This holds even if we take into
account that, within a group of coordinated firms, the rent has the character of a public good (Katz et al.
1990). Since improved coordination among rent seekers can be interpreted as a decline in the number of
competing parties, it triggers a drop of rent seeking eﬀorts. A similar result is derived by Bernheim and
Whinston (1986) for menu auctions: Firms that manage to align their interests on policy choices limit
the politicians’ ability to extract rents.
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depends on firms’ endogenously determined lobbying activities, is a strong point in favor of
including firms’ incentives to shape their business environment in the study of competition
in regulated industries. A number of recent papers (Besley and Case, 2000; Duso and
Röller, 2003; and Duso, 2002) indicate the importance of the endogeneity of regulation for
the assessment of market outcomes but do not identify the sources of such an endogeneity.
Our paper suggests that lobbying is such a source, because it is found to be endogenous
with respect to the product market.
This paper is an empirical counterpart to a growing theoretical literature, which ex-
plicitly models the link between firms’ behavior in the product market and their activities
along other dimensions, specifically, lobbying for regulation. Baron (1999) is the first to
provide a formal static model where market strategies are integrated with their political
actions, but he ignores cooperation among firms. Damania and Fredriksson (2000) and
(2002) show that firms incentive to form a lobby group in order to influence environmental
regulation crucially depends on the industry’s ability to collude in the product market as
well as on collusive profits.
In this paper we use the same market data as Parker and Röller (1997) who find that
prices in the cellular industry were, on average, significantly above the noncooperative
duopoly level and that conduct depended on exogenous product market characteristics,
such as multimarket contact5 and cross ownership.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the U.S. cellular market and
the data. In section 3 we develop a structural model of market interactions and present
our empirical specification considering lobbying as exogenous. In section 4 we endogenize
lobbying. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings, and we conclude in section 6.
5Note that, in their paper, the term ”multimarket” indicates that firms meet in several product
markets. In our paper we apply this concept to the relation between the product market and the political
arena.
4
2 The Data
The regulatory and market environment in the U.S. cellular industry in the second half
of the 1980’s are unique and constitute an excellent natural experiment for analyzing
the relationship between lobbying and competition. On the one hand, we observe, for
production as well as political decisions, many geographically separated markets within a
single industry (for the former, the Metropolitan Statistical Areas and for the latter, the
states). This fact guarantees enough heterogeneity — in the sense of statistical variation
— to investigate the empirical interrelation between market-level collusion and state-level
lobbying.
On the other hand, the product market is homogeneous, which justifies the same
functional specification for the demand and first order condition across markets. Moreover,
because of the homogeneity of the institutional environment across U.S. states, unobserved
heterogeneity in the estimation of the lobbying equation is minimized.
Another important characteristic of the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry is
that the market structure was exogenously determined during the entire sample period.
Each of the considered markets started in the middle of the 1980’s as a monopoly and
was subsequently opened up to a second firm. This peculiarity allows us to concentrate
on market conduct in a specified market structure and to rule out more complex games,
where firms make their production decisions under the pressure of potential entry.
The database that we use is remarkably rich and covers the sample period 1985-1988.
It contains product market variables such as prices, output, demand, cost, and market
structure variables and information about the regulatory and political environments, such
as the structure of the regulatory body and the composition of the states’ governments
and legislatures. Furthermore, it provides data on firms’ political activities measured by
their campaign contributions to political parties.
Part of the data has been already exploited in other studies. The market data were
collected and used by Parker and Röller (1997), and we aggregated them to yearly ob-
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servations in order to match the lobbying data.6 The political data originates form the
Book of the States and from the U.S. Statistical Abstract. The data on political contri-
butions were kindly provided by the Center of Responsive Politics that elaborates figures
stemming from the Federal Election Commission.7
Table 1 reports a brief description of the variables used in this study, whereas tables
2 and 3 contain the preliminary statistics. The first column of table 2 refers to the full
sample, in which observations do not follow a specific periodicity. The aggregated sample
represented in the second column of the table denotes the average observation for a given
year calculated to match the market variables to the lobbying data, which is observed on a
yearly basis. As a result the new market data contains one to four yearly observations for
each of the considered 122 metropolitan markets. The diﬀerences in the mean and stan-
dard errors of the variables between the two samples are very small and not statistically
significant.
Apart from market price (P) and quantity (Q),8 we have information on demand
shifters like the market population (POP), annual income per capita (INCOME), pop-
ulation density (DENSITY), and the number of high potential business establishments
(BUSINESS). The data on cost shifters include the cost of energy (ENERGY), oﬃce and
operation costs (RENT and OPERATE), labor costs in the cellular industry (WAGE),
and cost of capital (PRIME). Dummies equal to one indicate duopoly periods (ENTRY)
and markets that were subject to any form of price regulation (REGULATION).
In table 3 we report statistics for the political variables, which constitute a balanced
6The market data originate from many diﬀerent sources, such as Cellular Price and Marketing Let-
ter, Information Enterprise, Cellular Business, Cellular Market Data Book, EMCI, BOMA Experience
Exchange Report, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
U.S. Department of commerce, and Bureau of Census. We refer the interested reader to Parker and
Röller (1997) for a more precise description of the market data. We are very grateful to Phil Parker and
Lars-Hendrik Röller for allowing us to use their data.
7In particular, we thank Douglas Weber from the Center for Responsive Politics for making available
the unpublished data on political contributions for our sample period.
8The price of a singular cellular operator is defined as the monthly bill paid by a costumer for 500
minutes of usage, assuming that he chooses the least expensive among the diﬀerent plans oﬀered. Since
output levels are not directly observable, the quantity is proxied by the number of cellular antenna sites
used by operators. Parker and Röller calculated from a sub-sample with available output measures a
correlation index between the number of antennas and the number of subscribers equal to 0.92 (p-value
< 0.0001).
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panel with four yearly observations for each of the 40 states included in our sample.
The information covers the composition of the diﬀerent states’ legislature and executive:
a dummy equal to one if the governor came from the democratic party (GOVDEM),
and the governor’s salary (GSALARY). Variables related to the regulatory body are the
Public Utility Commission’s number of board members (PUCMEM), the length of their
oﬃce (PUCTERM), their salary (PUCSALARY), and the number of full-time employees
(PUCSTAFF). Indicators for election years (PRESELECT, FEDELECT, LEGISELECT)
and for how close the state-level election results of the parties were to each other (TIGHT)
are also included in the data set. Other potential controls for the lobbying process are
the population of the state (POPSTATE) and its average income (INCSTATE). Finally,
lobbying (LOBBY) represents the yearly aggregated campaign contributions from cellular
firms operating in a state to candidates of that state who campaign in federal elections.
All political variables lag one year with respect to the market and lobbying data
because a newly elected government needs some time before being able to implement
policy changes.
3 Market Conduct and Exogenous Lobbying
In this section, we explicitly model firms’ interactions in the product market adopting
an established tool in industrial organization: the conjectural variations approach. We
specify and estimate an oligopoly model at the industry level (see Bresnahan 1989), which
enables us to identify firms’ conduct in the market place through the simultaneous estima-
tion of a demand function and the first order condition for profit maximization. We then
study how firms’ lobbying activities, which in this first step are assumed to be exogenous,
influence firms’ market behavior.
The structural market model we apply was already specified and estimated by Parker
and Röller (1997). Let the inverse market demand be:9
Pms = P (Qms,X
D
ms). (1)
9Our estimations abstract from time eﬀects in the residuals, because the panel is too short and too
unbalanced. Therefore we omit time subscripts throughout.
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The price for cellular services Pms, in market m within state s depends on the market
production Qms and on a set of market specific demand shifters XDms. We assume that
the firm i’s variable costs C
¡
Qims,X
C
ms
¢
are a function of its output Qims and of a set
of exogenous market-specific cost shifters XCms. Each firm maximizes its profits with
respect to the produced quantity. We let the cost structure and conduct among firms
be symmetric, which, in homogeneous good industries, implies that each firm chooses the
same output level Qims = Qjms = Qms/Nms, where Nms is the number of firms. Hence the
optimality condition at the market level obtained by summing the individual first order
conditions over the Nms firms is:
θms
∂P (·)
∂Qms
Qms + P (·)−MC
µ
Qms
Nms
,XCms
¶
= 0, (2)
where MC (·) denotes the marginal cost function.
Equation (2) allows us to estimate market conduct using market data instead of firm-
level data. The conjectural variation, or conduct parameter θms measures the degree of
market competitiveness. If, in statistical sense, θms = 0, the market is perfectly compet-
itive; if θms = 1/Nms, firms behave as Cournot-Nash competitors; and if θms = 1, then
conduct is consistent with a monopoly or cartel.
We assume that the conjectural variation θms is not constant but rather a market
specific varying parameter:10
θms = θ (Ls, ENTRYms) , (3)
where Ls are the total lobbying expenditures by mobile telecommunications firms, as
measured by their campaign contributions to political parties, and ENTRYms is a dummy
variable equal to 1 when the second carrier entered the market. Specifying θms as a
non-constant parameter is a convenient way of addressing the relationship between the
agents’ behavior in the product market and in the political process without employing a
full structural model about the choice of regulation, its influence on profits and campaign
contributions at hand.
10See Mayo and Otsuka (1991) and Parker and Röller (1997) for the estimation of a varying conduct
parameter.
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The implementation of the above model involves the empirical specification of two
simultaneous equations (1), (2), and the varying conduct parameter (3). Following Parker
and Röller (1997), we choose a semilogarithmic specification for the inverse demand:
Pms = b0 + b1 log(Qms) + b2 POPms + b3 BUSINESSms
+b4 INCOMEms + b5 DENSITYms + b6 Y EARms + ²ms, (4)
where ²ms is an i.i.d. stochastic term. Marginal costs are approximated as a linear function
in quantity and the cost shifters:11
MCims = a0 + a1
Qms
1+ENTRYms
+ a2 ENERGYms + a3 WAGEms
+a4 RENTms + a5 Y EARms.
(5)
As we have ∂Pms/∂Qms = b1/Qms due to the semilogarithmic specification of the
inverse demand function, the empirical version of the firms behavior (2) reduces to:
Pms =MCms − b1θms + νms, (6)
where νms is an i.i.d. error.
For the sake of identification and in order to account for the influence of market struc-
ture on conduct, we allow the conduct parameter to vary across monopoly and duopoly
periods. Furthermore, we use the information gathered by this unique market structure
to perform a specification test proposed by Parker and Röller (1997). If our model is
correctly specified, it should, during monopoly periods, predict monopoly behavior, i.e. a
conduct parameter equal to one. For these periods and for the functional forms assumed
in (4) and (5), we could not reject the null hypothesis θms = 1 at the 5% confidence
level.12 This result confirms our demand and cost specification.
In order to increase the eﬃciency of our estimates, we impose θms = 1 for monopoly
periods. For duopoly periods, we assume that the conduct parameter is a function of
11Intuition might suggest that there are economies of density in the provision of cellular services,
because antennas can be used more eﬃciently in densely populated areas. In this paper DENSITY is
excluded from the cost shifters, because quantity is proxied by the number of antennas and we would not
expect the costs of an additional antenna to decrease in population density. We also eliminated PRIME
and OPERATE, since they are highly correlated with YEAR and RENT.
12In order to fully exploit the available information, the test was carried out using the original, non-
aggregated data.
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lobbying expenditures that, at this stage, are taken to be exogenous:
θms =



1
1
1+exp(−eθms)
if monopoly
if duopoly,
(7)
where eθms = d0 + d1LOBBYs. The functional form ensures that the conduct para-
meter is estimated within its theoretical bounds, while preserving a strictly monotonic
transformation of eθms to θms.
We also impose the second order condition for a profit maximum:13
b1 =
a1 Qms
θms (1 +ENTRYms) (2− θms)
− exp(e). (8)
The empirical implementation of the model developed in this section implies the si-
multaneous estimation of equations (4) and (6), with the second order condition (8) and
the varying conduct parameter (7).
4 Endogenous Lobbying
Firms anticipate the impact of their lobbying expenditures on regulation, which even-
tually aﬀects the product market. Therefore, they take their product market strategy
into account when deciding about lobbying expenditures and vice versa. This argument
suggests that lobbying expenditures are endogenous. Estimating the above exogenous
lobbying model results in inconsistent estimates of the impact lobbying has on market
conduct. In this section, we extend the previous model in order to account for the poten-
tial endogeneity of lobbying expenditures.
Lacking a comprehensive economic model that interrelates lobbying expenditures, po-
tentially multidimensional regulatory decisions, and the product market game, we esti-
mate a flexible descriptive rather than a structural lobbying equation. The exogenous
variables it contains are selected on the basis of the theoretical literature discussed above.
The key idea is that lobbying expenditures depend on firms’ ability to coordinate in
13Equation (8) is the empirical implementation of the second order condition derived by diﬀerentiating
equation (2) with respect to the total market quantity Qms.
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the political market. Therefore, we consider as explanatory variables those characteristics
that can be expected to influence firms’ incentives and ability to coordinate their lobbying
activities.
First, we control for the impact of future market profitability — as expressed by the
state’s population and per capita income — on lobbying expenditures, because firms’ in-
centive to lobby for a favorable regulatory environment increases with the benefits which
can be gained in such an environment. Second, regulatory and political factors are taken
into account, since these shape firms’ ability to lobby and the cost to eﬀectively influence
the policy maker. Therefore, we control for governments’ characteristics as well as the
structure of the state regulatory body. Also, we consider the impact of the regulatory
regime on campaign contributions, since it is crucial to those regulatory issues that firms
want to address. Finally, we control for the number of firms acting in the state, because
it aﬀect firms’ ability to coordinate their rent seeking eﬀorts.14
Our empirical specification of the lobbying equation is a linear combination of the
discussed exogenous variables:
LOBBYs = c0 +Πsc1 +Gs c2 +Rsc3 + c4 REGULATIONs + c4 SFIRMs + ηs, (9)
where c1, c2, c3, c4, and c5 are vectors and scalars of coeﬃcients, while Πs denotes the
measures of the future market profitability, Gs political variables, Rs regulatory control
variables, REGULATIONs is a dummy equal to one if the state is regulated, SFIRMSs
is the number of firms in the state, and ηs is an i.i.d. stochastic term.
The empirical implementation of the full model implies the simultaneous estimation
of equations (4), (6), and (9) with the varying conduct parameter specified in (7) and the
second order condition (8).
14Recently, a number of theoretical contributions have also accounted for endogenous lobbying forma-
tion focusing on the role of market structure as a coordination device (e.g. Mitra, 1999; Pecorino, 1998;
Pecorino, 2001; and Hillman et al., 2001 ).
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4.1 Testing the Endogeneity of Lobbying
In order to assess whether lobbying is endogenous to the market strategies, we perform
a Durbin-Wu-Hausman specification test based on artificial regressions.15 The basic idea
of the original Hausman’s (1978) endogeneity test is to contrast two vectors of estimates,
one of which is consistent under weaker conditions than the other. Davisdson and McKin-
non (1989) develop a more general specification test based on artificial regression. Their
procedure consists of testing whether the fitted values of the potentially endogenous vari-
able are correlated with the error term of the equation where the potential endogeneity
problem is present. If this is not the case, the least squared estimate of the simple model
are consistent.
To clarify how the test is performed, we briefly describe our procedure. We write our
model in a slightly diﬀerent fashion as follows:
Pms = f1(X
D
ms, Qms,φ1) + ²1, (10)
Qms = f2(X
C
ms, Pms, g (Ls) ,φ2) + ²2, (11)
Ls = f3
¡
XLs ,φ3
¢
+ ²3, (12)
where XLs is a matrix of exogenous variables that influences lobbying decisions, and φi,
i = 1, 2, 3 are matrices of parameters. Note that (10) corresponds to (4) and (11) is just a
transformation of (6) where we solve for Q.We want to test whether L is endogenous. The
lobbying equation (12) is estimated by OLS and the fitted values bL are computed. We
then consider the following artificial regression, where the fitted values of L are inserted
in (11) as an additional explanatory variable:
Qms = f2(X
C
ms, Pms, g (Ls) ,φ2) + δbLs + ²2. (13)
15See Davidson and McKinnon (1993) for a general presentation of the DWH test based on artificial
regressions.
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We finally estimate (12) and (13) simultaneously and test the hypothesis that the
parameter δ is equal to zero.16 If the null hypothesis is rejected, one can conclude that
lobbying is endogenous and must account for this fact by using the full model as presented
in the previous section.
5 Results
We estimate the above models applying a full information maximum likelihood (FIML)
with normally distributed error terms.17 Before comparing the findings from the exoge-
nous and endogenous lobbying models, we shortly discuss a preliminary estimation of the
market model with a constant conduct parameter and test behavioral hypotheses.
Table 4 reports the results of the FIML estimation where we impose θms = 1 for the
monopoly period as well as the second order condition (8) in order to enhance eﬃciency.18
The table shows that most of the estimated coeﬃcients in the marginal cost equation are
significant and of the expected sign. The eﬀect of quantity is negative and significantly
diﬀerent from zero, which suggests the presence of increasing returns to scale. In the
inverse demand equation the per capita income and population density have a significant
impact, which is positive as expected. This means, that cellular prices were significantly
higher in rich and densely populated metropolitan areas. All other exogenous variables,
except YEAR, are also significant and positive. The point estimate for the constant con-
duct parameter is equal to 0.76.19 At the 5% significance level cartel behavior cannot be
rejected, while Cournot-Nash conduct cannot be rejected at the 10% level. The competi-
tive equilibrium is ruled out at type-I errors of 1%. This result suggests that, on average,
firms in the U.S. mobile telecommunications sector behaved more collusively than in a
noncooperative duopoly even after the second firm had entered the market.20
16We do not impose the second order condition in order to limit the endogeneity problem to the first
order condition equation (6).
17See appendix A for details.
18As a robustness check, we estimated the same model without imposing the second order condition
and ex post verified that it is satisfied.
19A similar result was originally obtained by Parker and Röller (1997). The adopted specification is,
though, slightly diﬀerent, which explains the deviations in the point estimates for some of the parameters.
20The average firms’ conduct appears to be remarkably stable during the sample period: repeating
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5.1 Exogenous Lobbying
The results from the estimation of the market model where the conduct parameter is a
function of exogenous lobbying expenditures are reported in table 5. Qualitatively the
new findings reflect those derived from the model with constant conduct even though there
are some quantitative diﬀerences between the two specifications. While the significance
level of all coeﬃcients’ estimates does not change, the coeﬃcients are slightly diﬀerent in
the two models.
The central result of this specification pertains to the estimation of the varying conduct
parameter. The coeﬃcient of the constant term in the conduct equation d0 is significant
and positive as expected. Measured by the estimate of d1, campaign contributions have
no significant impact on conduct. Due to our specification, the lobbying coeﬃcient re-
ported in the table estimates ∂eθms/∂LOBBYs and not the marginal eﬀect of campaign
contributions on market conduct, ∂θms/∂LOBBYs. We compute the latter by means of
the delta method. Evaluated at the sample mean of LOBBYs, the resulting parameter
is equal to −0.0110 with a standard error of 0.0102. Hence, assuming firms’ campaign
contributions are exogenous, we do not find a significant impact of these contributions on
market conduct.
5.2 Endogenous Lobbying
We can now turn to the results from the simultaneous estimation of the full model: the
inverse market demand, market supply, and lobbying expenditures including the varying
conduct parameter and the second order condition (8). The findings are presented in
table 6. In the marginal cost equation, we observe minor diﬀerences in the estimates’
size among this and the previous specifications. Again, among cost shifters only RENT
and YEAR are significant. As expected, marginal costs have increased with the cost of
rental space and decreased during the sample period. The coeﬃcient for quantity is also
in this specification negative and significantly diﬀerent from zero suggesting increasing
the estimation of table 4 with four year specific conduct parameters (not displayed here) did not lead to
significant diﬀerences among them.
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returns to scale. The estimators in the demand equation perform more satisfactory in
terms of significance and sign, and they show quantitative but not qualitative diﬀerences
with respect to those obtained with the exogenous lobbying model. All demand drivers,
except YEAR, are significant and positive as expected and as already observed in the
previous models.
Also in the endogenous lobbying model, our focus is on the varying conduct parameter.
The constant has a positive and significant coeﬃcient. Again, we compute the marginal
eﬀect of campaign contributions on conduct by transforming the estimate d1 at the sample
mean of LOBBYs. The resulting estimate is equal to −0.0151 with a standard deviation
of 0.0062, which is significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% confidence level. The
diﬀerence between the exogenous and the endogenous lobbying model in evaluating eﬀect
of campaign contributions on conduct is a first evidence that endogeneity of campaign
contributions matters.21
For the interpretation of our finding that high lobbying expenditures hinder collusive
agreements we refer to the theoretical literature. If we assume, based on Bernheim’s
and Whinston’s (1990) multimarket argument, that coordination in the product market
improves firms’ ability to coordinate their political actions, the observed negative relation-
ship linking product market collusion to the actual lobbying expenditures must be due
to the private nature of the contested rent. Interpreted in the light of the rent-seeking
literature quoted earlier, the reduction in the number of competing players — which is a
consequence of coordination — leads to a lower degree of rent dissipation. Similarly, we
would expect such a result from the menu-auction approach, were the auctioneer’s profits
increase with the level of conflict among the bidders. Coordination can be seen as a device
that reduces the firms’ heterogeneity in valuations about the feasible political decisions
by equalizing their payoﬀs under alternative regimes. As a result of more homogeneous
interests, firms spend less money or eﬀort to avoid policies that, without coordination,
21Parker and Röller (1997) find that cross-ownership and multimarket contact had a significant impact
on market behavior. We check the robustness of our results, by estimating various models, where we
control for these and other market structure characteristics in the estimation of conduct. Throughout we
find a negative and significant impact of campaign contributions on conduct.
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would have weakened their own strategic position relative to their competitors’. In other
words, coordination among conflicting parties reduces the costs of buying a particular
policy decision.
If, however, fighting regulation were a pure public good for the firms, then a higher
degree of coordination would imply greater rent seeking eﬀorts. Hence, the observed re-
lationship between campaign contributions and market conduct must be due to the fact
that coordination in lobbying and collusion are negatively related. As pointed out by
Ludema (2001) this can be the case when defection in individual lobbying expenditures
are observed significantly lagged. This eﬀect, however, relies on the existence of an ob-
servational gap, such that any deviation in lobbying is only unveiled one period after the
market game has finished.22
Pertaining to the lobbying equation, we find that, ceteris paribus, campaign contribu-
tions are significantly higher when several firms are present in the market. If regulation
is a private good, the empirically established relationship between market structure and
lobbying expenditures would imply that firms are not well coordinated and an increase
in the number of firms raises total campaign contributions, because each firm spends too
much money to protect its private interest. If, however, regulation is perceived to be a
public good, this result implies that firms are coordinated in the political market and
manage to avoid the free rider problem. We cannot explore this relationship in more
depth, given our descriptive approach, however we stress that market structure appar-
ently has an important eﬀect on firms’ decision of whether to participate in the political
market or not.23
In explaining campaign contributions, future market profitability measured by the
state’s population and, to a lower extent, per-capita income is found to have a strong
22This limitation substantially reduces the attractiveness of Ludema’s point, especially because it is
empirically diﬃcult to identify the existence and the length of this observational gap.
23There exists an extensive empirical literature concerning the role of market structure on lobbying
expenditures. A few studies find that concentration has a positive and significant eﬀect on campaign
contributions (e.g. Pittman, 1988), others obtain a negative and significant relationship (Salomon and
Siegfried, 1977 and Zardkhooi, 1985 ). The majority, however, do not find any significant eﬀect or mixed
results (e.g. Grier et. al., 1991 and Grier and Munger, 1991). See Potters and Sloof (1996) for an
excellent survey of the empirical literature on interest groups.
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positive impact, which is however significant only for the former variable. The fact that
future market profitability seems to be important for the firms tendency to lobby politi-
cians or bureaucrats can be explained with the lag between the payment of campaign
contributions and the actual policy decision.
The number of full time employees in the PUC has a negative and significant impact
on campaign contributions. A possible interpretation is that larger bureaucratic insti-
tutions are more diﬃcult to influence than smaller ones. Thus, large PUCs reduce the
degree of eﬃciency to which firms campaign contributions aﬀect regulatory decisions in
the cellular market. Moreover, we show that campaign contributions are higher in states
where the salaries of PUC members are high, suggesting high costs of capturing rich of-
ficials. Campaign contributions significantly decrease with regulation. This might reflect
that the issues firms try to address through lobbying depend on the regulatory regime.
Finally, we find that political contributions increase in federal election years echoing the
needs of candidates to finance their campaigns.
We analyze the endogeneity of lobbying expenditures by means of a DWH test based
on artificial regressions. The null hypothesis of exogeneity to be tested is δ = 0 in the
model given by the two equations (10) and (13). Since there is only one restriction to
test, a simple t-statistic can be used. We estimate the model with diﬀerent techniques in
order to investigate the robustness of our results. For all estimations the null hypothesis
is rejected at least at the 10% significance level.24 Hence, campaign contributions are to
be considered statistically endogenous with respect to the market game. This important
result confirms our view that firms’ lobbying decisions and their product market strategies
are interdependent. Estimating the eﬀect of campaign contributions on product market
conduct without considering that the former are a part of firms profit maximizing strategy,
would lead to inconsistent estimates.
24We used 2SLS, 3SLS, and FIML. The t-statistics for the diﬀerent models are 1.83, 1.96, and 1.61
with asymptotic p-values of 0.0686, 0.0508, and 0.1085 respectively.
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6 Conclusions
This paper empirically examines the relationship between product market competition and
lobbying expenditures. We apply a structural market model and estimate whether the
contributions to the political parties aﬀect market behavior taking into account lobbying
endogeneity. Depending on the interrelation between firms’ conduct in the underlying
market and lobbying games and on the nature of the contested rent, the eﬀect of firms’
political activities on their product market conduct can be positive or negative. One of
the aims of our study is to analyze the existence and sign of such an eﬀect.
Because of its unique regulatory and market environment, we investigate data from the
U.S. mobile telecommunications industry that guarantees enough variation in all relevant
dimensions to identify firms’ market and political behavior.
In order to estimate market interactions, we adopt the conjectural variations approach,
which we have modified to allow for a varying conduct parameter across markets and
augmented by the estimation of the endogenous lobbying equation. Since regulatory
decisions and campaign contributions are made at the state rather than at the market
level, we estimate the lobbying equation using the states as the observation unit, whereas
the observation unit for the market game are the Metropolitan Statistical Areas. The
diﬀerent models are estimated by non linear full information maximum likelihood.
In the endogenous lobbying model, we find a strong and significant relationship be-
tween our measure of collusion and the industry’s campaign contributions. This relation is
negative, implying that higher lobbying expenditures foster a more competitive industry.
Our interpretation of this result relies on a multimarket contact type of argument, which
suggests that lobbying formation acts as a coordination device for product market collu-
sion and vice versa. Under this presumption, the negative relationship between product
market conduct and the industry’s campaign contributions indicates that the regulation
which firms try to influence, is a private good among them.
The second important result of our study is that lobbying expenditures must be consid-
ered endogenous. From the empirical point of view, the explicit consideration of lobbying
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endogeneity allows a consistent and unbiased estimation of campaign contributions’ eﬀect
on market conduct. Moreover, this finding gives empirical support to for the hypothesis
that firms not only interact in the product market but are also active in the political
market with the aim of influencing the regulatory environment where they operate.
These considerations have important policy implications as well, since ignoring the in-
teraction of political and market activities might misguide the evaluation of competition
policy on firms’ behavior. Consider the following simplifying example. Assume that the
regulatory authority has instruments to successfully fight collusive behavior in order to
enhance consumers’ welfare. If product market cooperation is positively related to firms’
cooperation in the political arena, then a regulatory intervention that reduces collusion
will also decrease coordination in lobbying. In the case of a private good type of regu-
lation, this implies an increase in campaign contributions, which amounts to a possible
welfare reduction, since lobbying expenditures are partially wasteful.25 Similarly, limi-
tations on campaign contributions might have unexpected welfare eﬀects by influencing
firms’ behavior in the product market.
This paper gives a more comprehensive view of firms’ behavior in a regulated industry
than shown in the existing empirical literature. A challenging task for future research
is the extension of the structural analysis used to model product market interactions to
the firms’ political behavior. Beyond that, the interactions between firms and policy
makers should also be considered in a political economy model of regulation. Thus, a full
structural empirical model, where regulation and firms’ behavior in the product as well as
in the political markets are endogenously considered, seems to be the natural extension
of our approach.
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A The Log-Likelihood Function of the Endogenous
Lobbying Model
The FIML estimation applied in this study matches the specific data structure: policy
and lobbying decisions are made at the state level but each state contains an idiosyn-
cratic number of markets, Ms.26 Denote the vector of residuals for state s with εs, with
dim(εs) = 2Ms + 1. The residuals are a vector valued function fs of all endogenous
variables ys = (P1s, . . . PMss, Q1s, . . . QMss, Ls)
0 and all exogenous variables xs:
εs = fs(ys,xs).
The log-likelihood of estimating equation (9), Ms inverse demand equations (4), and Ms
quantity setting equations (6) by nonlinear FIML is
l = const+
X
s
ln |detJs|+ 1
2
X
s
ln(detΣ−1s )−
1
2
X
s
f 0sΣ
−1
s fs, (14)
where Σs is the state specific covariance and Js = ∂fs/∂y0s. Rewriting Σs yields


ΣP ΣPQ ΣPL
ΣPQ ΣQ ΣQL
Σ0PL Σ
0
QL σL

 ,
where ΣP and ΣQ are covariance matrices of the inverse demand and supply equations
respectively, while σL denotes the variance of the lobbying equation. The matrices ΣPL
and ΣQL are the covariances between the market equations and the lobbying equation.
We assume that all markets and all states are independent and that all residuals
of a specific type of equation are drawn from the same normal distribution with zero
mean and variance σP , σQ, and σL. Thereby ΣP = 1Ms · σP , ΣQ = 1Ms · σQ, and
ΣPQ = 1Ms · σPQ, where 1Ms is a Ms-dimensional identity matrix and σPQ denotes the
covariance between the inverse demand equation and the supply equation in the same
market. Furthermore, let the covariance between the market equations and the state
equation be such that (I) the general ”aﬃnity” of the state equation to a specific type of
26The estimation abstracts from time eﬀects in the residuals because the panel is too short and too
unbalanced. Hence, for convenience, we omit the time subscript in this appendix.
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market activity (i.e., demand or supply) within this state is independent of the number of
these markets and (II) the covariances between the state equation and all market equations
of the same type in this state are equal. Assumption (I) is reflected by cov(εLs, εPs1 +
· · · + εPsMs) = σPL and cov(εLs, εQs1 + · · · + εQsMs) = σQL while assumption (II) leads
to cov(εLs, εPs1) = · · · = cov(εLs, εPsMs) and cov(εLs, εQs1) = · · · = cov(εLs, εQsMs). This
implies that cov(εLs, εPsm) = 1/MsσPL and cov(εLs, εQsm) = 1/MsσQL for all markets
m = 1, . . . ,Ms. Hence, ΣPL = uMs · σPL/Ms and ΣQL = uMs · σQL/Ms, where uMs is a
Ms-dimensional column vector of ones. With this structure, the correlation between the
lobbying equation and the sum of the residuals of the market equations of either type
decreases in Ms.27
27In a sensitivity check, we imposed σPL = σQL = 0. The estimates are qualitatively not aﬀected by
this change.
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B Tables
Table 1. Definition of Variables
Variables Definition
p Monthly bill for 500 minutes usage1)
(assuming consumers chose the least expensive plan)1)
Q Quantity proxy: Total number of cells in a given network1)
TIME Time trend in months1)
POP Market (MSA) Population in million inhabitants1)
INCOME Market (MSA) annual income per capita in 10.000 $ 1)
BUSINESS Number of high-potential business establishments (business,
health care,professional and legal services, contract construction,
transportation, finance,insurance,real estate) divided by 1000 1)
ENERGY Average monthly cost per square foot of oﬃce space (in $)1)
PRIME One period lagged prime lending rate1)
WAGE Average weekly salary per employee for the cellular industry (in 100 $)1)
RENT Average monthly rent per square foot of oﬃce space1)
OPERATE Average monthly general overhead and operating expenses
per square foot of oﬃce space1)
ENTRY Dummy=1 after the second carrier enters into the market1)
SFIRMS Number of firms operating in state s at time t1)
REGULATION Dummy=1 if no price regulatory ban was imposed in the market2)
GOVDEM Dummy=1 if the State’s Governor was from the democratic party3)
GSALARY Governor’s annual salary in 10.000 $ 3)
PRESELECT Dummy = 1 if year of presidential election3)
LEGISLELECT Percentage of the state’s legislature that was up for election in a given year3)
FEDELECT Dummy = 1 if year of federal election (Senate and House)3)
TIGHT Absolute value of the % diﬀerence between Republicans’ and Democrats’
seats in the state’s legislature3)
PUCMEM Number of Members the State Public Utility Commission (PUC)3)
PUCTERM Length of term of the PUC members (years)3)
PUCSTAFF Number of full-time employees in the State Public Utility Commission3)
PUCSAL PUC members’ annual salary in 10.000 $ 3)
POPSTATE State Population in million inhabitants 3)
INCSTATE State annual income per capita in 10.000 $ 3)
LOBBY Total industry annual campaign contributions in 10.000 $ (without AT&T)4)
Sources: 1) Parker-Röller (1997); 2) Duso (2003); 3) The Book of States, The U.S. Statistical
Abstract; 4) Center of Responsive Politics
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Table 2. Preliminary Statistics - Market Variables
Full sample Aggregated sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
p 1.972 0.393 1.952 0.400
Q 15.665 17.346 15.097 16.976
TIME 49.240 12.342 51.309 13.879
POP 0.186 0.266 0.172 0.251
INCOME 2.825 0.375 2.809 0.371
DENSITY 0.502 0.398 0.479 0.372
BUSINESS 2.247 0.413 2.226 0.426
ENERGY 1.760 0.372 1.764 0.376
PRIME 9.456 1.107 9.363 1.150
WAGE 5.197 1.285 5.239 1.342
RENT 16.247 4.904 16.526 4.884
OPERATE 6.704 1.683 6.622 1.688
ENTRY 0.680 0.467 0.699 0.449
Observations 478 288
Table 3. Preliminary Statistics - Political Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
GOVDEM 0.619 0.487
GSALARY 7.275 1.689
PRESELECT 0.250 0.434
LEGISLELECT 0.385 0.417
FEDELECT 0.500 0.502
TIGHT 0.315 0.236
PUCMEM 3.988 1.336
PUCTERM 5.456 1.181
PUCSTAFF 209.394 201.180
PUCSALARY 5.549 1.347
POPSTATE 0.562 0.533
INCSTATE 1.309 0.251
LOBBY 3.150 2.881
REGULATION 0.500 0.502
SFIRMS 2.550 1.120
Observations 160
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Table 4. Market Model - Constant Conduct Parameter
Coeﬃcient Std. Err.
Marginal Cost
constant 1.2518 0.2162 ***
Q -0.0027 0.0010 **
ENERGY -0.0138 0.0426
WAGE 0.0101 0.0144
RENT 0.0291 0.0052 ***
YEAR -0.0776 0.0230 ***
Inverse Demand
constant 1.5953 0.2317 ***
POP 1.4173 0.3394 ***
BUSINESS 0.0837 0.0427 **
DENSITY 0.3152 0.0980 ***
INCOME 0.2552 0.0792 ***
YEAR 0.0648 0.0440
Second Order Condition
e -0.6647 0.2462
Conduct Parameter
θms 0.7635 0.0985 ***
Test for Cournot (θ = 0.5)a 2.675 *
Test for Cartel (θ = 1)a -2.401 **
FIML estim ates; 478 Observations; Second order condition (8) imposed;
***, **, and * denote signifi cance at the 1% , 5% , and 10% levels resp ectively.
a
For the two tests t-statistics are reported .
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Table 5. Market Model - Variable Conduct Parameter
Exogenous Lobbying
Coeﬃcient Std. Err.
Marginal Cost
constant 1.2366 0.2212 ***
Q -0.0024 0.0010 **
ENERGY -0.0164 0.0428
WAGE 0.0106 0.0142
RENT 0.0294 0.0054 ***
YEAR -0.0714 0.0242 ***
Inverse Demand
constant 1.6069 0.2276 ***
POP 1.3798 0.3323 ***
BUSINESS 0.0867 0.0425 **
INCOME 0.3086 0.0963 ***
DENSITY 0.2601 0.0807 ***
YEAR 0.0635 0.0442
Second Order Condition
e -0.6656 0.2482 ***
Conduct Parameter
constant 1.4214 0.6411 ***
LOBBY -0.0631 0.0527
FIML estimates; 288 Observations; Second order condition (8) imposed ;
*** and ** denotes sign ifi cance at th1% and 5% levels resp ectively.
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Table 6. Full Model - Variable Conduct Parameter
Endogenous Lobbying
Coeﬃcient Std. Err.
Marginal Cost
constant 1.2080 0.1820 ***
Q -0.0021 0.0010 **
ENERGY -0.0198 0.0451
WAGE 0.0096 0.0130
RENT 0.0301 0.0047 ***
YEAR -0.0718 0.0220 ***
Inverse Demand
constant 1.5568 0.2225 ***
POP 1.4617 0.3256 ***
BUSINESS 0.0950 0.0528 *
INCOME 0.3276 0.0897 ***
DENSITY 0.2601 0.0894 ***
YEAR 0.0704 0.0388
Second Order Condition
e -0.6167 0.1992 ***
Conduct Parameter
constant 1.4225 0.5457 ***
LOBBY -0.0833 0.0420 **
Lobbying Equation
constant -2.8111 1.4060 **
GOVDEM 0.0197 0.3386
GSALARY -0.1492 0.1597
PUCTERM -0.0271 0.1501
PUCSTAFF -0.3209 0.1489 **
PUCSAL 0.4944 0.2246 **
POP_STATE 3.3490 0.5282 ***
INC_STATE 1.0598 0.8271
TIGHT -0.8366 0.8423
FEDELECTION 1.9177 0.3364 ***
REGULATION -0.8161 0.3441 **
SFIRMS 0.6454 0.1661 ***
FIML estimates; 288 market and 125 state observations; Second order condition (8)
is imposed ; *** and ** denote signifi cance at the 1 and 5% levels resp ectively.
30
Bücher des Forschungsschwerpunkts Markt und politische Ökonomie  
Books of the Research Area Markets and Political Economy  
 
Andreas Stephan 
Essays on the Contribution of Public Infrastruc-
ture to Private:  Production and its Political 
Economy 
2002, dissertation.de 
Hans Mewis 
Essays on Herd Behavior and Strategic 
Delegation 
2001, Shaker Verlag 
Andreas Moerke 
Organisationslernen über Netzwerke – Die 
personellen Verflechtungen von 
Führungsgremien japanischer 
Aktiengesellschaften 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Silke Neubauer 
Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Christian Wey (Eds.) 
Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft in der neuen 
Weltwirtschaft, WZB Jahrbuch 2001 
2001, edition sigma 
Michael Tröge 
Competition in Credit Markets: A Theoretic 
Analysis 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Tobias Miarka 
Financial Intermediation and Deregulation:  
A Critical Analysis of Japanese Bank-Firm-
Relationships 
2000, Physica-Verlag 
Rita Zobel 
Beschäftigungsveränderungen und 
organisationales Lernen in japanischen 
Industriengesellschaften 
2000, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/zobel-
rita-2000-06-19  
Jos Jansen 
Essays on Incentives in Regulation and 
Innovation 
2000, Tilburg University 
Ralph Siebert 
Innovation, Research Joint Ventures, and 
Multiproduct Competition 
2000, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/siebert-
ralph-2000-03-23/  
Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller (Eds.) 
The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in 
Europe and the Member States 
2000, edition sigma 
Jianping Yang 
Bankbeziehungen deutscher Unternehmen: 
Investitionsverhalten und Risikoanalyse 
2000, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Christoph Schenk 
Cooperation between Competitors – 
Subcontracting and the Influence of Information, 
Production and Capacity on Market Structure and 
Competition 
1999, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/schenk-
christoph-1999-11-16  
Horst Albach, Ulrike Görtzen, Rita Zobel (Eds.) 
Information Processing as a Competitive 
Advantage of Japanese Firms 
1999, edition sigma 
Dieter Köster 
Wettbewerb in Netzproduktmärkten 
1999, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Christian Wey 
Marktorganisation durch Standardisierung: Ein 
Beitrag zur Neuen Institutionenökonomik des 
Marktes 
1999, edition sigma 
Horst Albach, Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin Antal, 
Kristina Vaillant (Hg.) 
Organisationslernen – institutionelle und 
kulturelle Dimensionen 
WZB-Jahrbuch 1998 
1998, edition sigma 
Lars Bergman, Chris Doyle, Jordi Gual, Lars 
Hultkrantz, Damien Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller, 
Leonard Waverman 
Europe’s Network Industries: Conflicting 
Priorities - Telecommunications 
Monitoring European Deregulation 1 
1998, Centre for Economic Policy Research 
Manfred Fleischer  
The Inefficiency Trap 
Strategy Failure in the  
German Machine Tool Industry 
1997, edition sigma 
Christian Göseke 
Information Gathering and Dissemination 
The Contribution of JETRO to  
Japanese Competitiveness 
1997, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 2001 
 
 
Fredrik Andersson 
Kai A. Konrad 
Globalization and Human Capital Formation FS IV 01 – 01 
Andreas Stephan Regional Infrastructure Policy and its Impact 
on Productivity: A Comparison of Germany 
and France 
FS IV 01 – 02 
Tomaso Duso Lobbying and Regulation in a Political Economy: 
Evidence from the US Cellular Industry 
FS IV 01 – 03 
Steffen Huck 
Kai A. Konrad 
Wieland Müller 
Merger and Collusion in Contest FS IV 01 – 04 
Steffen Huck 
Kai A. Konrad 
Wieland Müller 
Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost 
Advantages: The Role of Internal Organization, 
Information, and Market Structure 
FS IV 01 – 05 
Jos Jansen Strategic Information Revelation and Revenue 
Sharing in an R&D Race 
(A revision of FS IV 99-11) 
FS IV 01 – 06 
Astrid Jung Are Product Innovation and Flexible Technology 
Complements? 
FS IV 01 – 07 
Jonas Björnerstedt 
Johan Stennek 
Bilateral Oligopoly FS IV 01 – 08 
Manfred Fleischer Regulierungswettbewerb und Innovation in der 
chemischen Industrie 
FS IV 01 – 09 
Karl Wärneryd Rent, Risk, and Replication –  
Preference Adaptation in Winner-Take-All Markets 
FS IV 01 – 10 
Karl Wärneryd Information in Conflicts FS IV 01 – 11 
Steffen Huck 
Kai A. Konrad 
Merger Profitability and Trade Policy FS IV 01 – 12 
Michal Grajek Gender Pay Gap in Poland FS IV 01 – 13 
Achim Kemmerling 
Andreas Stephan 
The Contribution of Local Public Infra-structure to 
Private Productivity and its Political-Economy:  
Evidence from a Panel of Large German Cities 
FS IV 01 – 14 
Suchan Chae 
Paul Heidhues 
Nash Bargaining Solution with Coalitions and the 
Joint Bargaining Paradox 
FS IV 01 – 15 
Kai A. Konrad 
Harald Künemund 
Kjell Erik Lommerud 
Julio R. Robledo 
Geography of the Family FS IV 01 – 16 
Tomaso Duso 
Lars-Hendrik Röller 
Towards a Political Economy of Industrial Organ-
ization: Empirical Regularities from Deregulation 
FS IV 01 – 17 
Kai A. Konrad Investment in the Absence of Property Rights – The 
Role of Incumbency Advantages 
FS IV 01 – 18 
Roman Inderst 
Christian Wey 
Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in 
Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries 
FS IV 01 – 19 
 
Kai A. Konrad 
Helmut Seitz 
Fiscal Federalism and Risk Sharing in Germany: 
The Role of Size Differences 
FS IV 01 – 20 
Klaus Gugler 
Dennis C. Mueller 
B. Burcin Yurtoglu 
Christine Zulehner 
The Effects of Mergers:  An International Compari-
son 
FS IV 01 – 21 
Kjell Erik Lommerud 
Odd Rune Straume 
Lars Sørgard 
Downstream Merger with Oligopolistic Input 
Suppliers 
FS IV 01 – 22 
Andreas Blume 
Paul Heidhues 
Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions FS IV 01 – 23 
Roman Inders 
Christian Wey 
The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly FS IV 01 – 24 
Klaus Gugler 
Dennis C. Mueller 
B. Burcin Yurtoglu 
Corporate Governance, Capital Market Discipline 
and the Returns on Investment 
FS IV 01 – 25 
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson 
Johan Stennek 
Why Mergers Reduce Profits and Raise Share 
Prices:  A Theory of Preemptive Mergers 
FS IV 01 – 26  
 
 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 2002 
 
 
Fredrik Andersson 
Kai A. Konrad 
Human Capital Investment and Globalization in 
Extortionary States 
FS IV 02 – 01 
Lars-Hendrik Röller 
Christian Wey 
Merger Control in the New Economy FS IV 02 – 02 
Talat Mahmood 
Klaus Schömann 
Die Determinanten der Mirgrationsentscheidung 
von IT-Hochschulabsolventen aus Pakistan –
Empirische Befunde zur Ausgestaltung der 
deutschen „Green Card“ 
FS IV 02 – 03 
Jos Jansen The Effects of Disclosure Regulation on Innovative 
Firms:  Common Values 
FS IV 02 – 04 
Jos Jansen The Effects of Disclosure Regulation on Innovative 
Firms:  Private Values 
FS IV 02 – 05 
Günter Franke 
Harris Schlesinger 
Richard C. Stapleton 
Multiplicative Background Risk FS IV 02 – 06  
Tomaso Duso On the Politics of the Regulatory Reform:  
Econometric Evidence from the OECD Countries 
FS IV 02 – 07 
Johan Lagerlöf 
Paul Heidhues 
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in 
Merger Control 
FS IV 02 – 08 
Olivier Cadot 
Lars-Hendrik Röller 
Andreas Stephan 
Contribution to Productivity or Pork Barrel?  The 
Two Faces of Infrastructure Investment 
FS IV 02 – 09 
Justus Haucap 
Christian Wey 
Unionization Structures and Firms’ Incentives for 
Productivity Enhancing Investments 
FS IV 02 – 10  
Heidrun C. Hoppe 
Emre Ozdenoren 
Intermediation in Innovation FS IV 02 – 11 
Rainer Nitsche On the Effectiveness of Anti-Predation Rules FS IV 02 – 12 
Daniel Krähmer Entry and Experimentation in  
Oligopolistic Markets for Experience Goods 
FS IV 02 – 13 
J. Peter Murmann The Coevolution of Industries and National 
Institutions: Theory and Evidence 
FS IV 02 – 14 
Kai A. Konrad Terrorism and the State FS IV 02 – 15 
Robert Nuscheler Physician Reimbursement, Time-Consistency and 
the Quality of Care 
FS IV 02 – 16 
Fredrik Andersson 
Kai A. Konrad 
Taxation and Education Investment in the Tertiary 
Sector 
FS IV 02 – 17 
Jan Boone ‘Be nice, unless it pays to fight’: A New Theory of 
Price Determination with Implications for 
Competition Policy 
FS IV 02 – 18 
Kai A. Konrad Altruism and Envy in Contests: 
An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis 
FS IV 02 – 19 
Helmut Bester 
Kai A. Konrad 
Delay in Contests FS IV 02 – 20 
Kjell Erik Lommerud 
Bjørn Sandvik 
Odd Rune Straume 
Good Jobs, Bad Jobs and Redistribution FS IV 02 – 21 
Steffen Huck 
Vicki Knoblauch 
Wieland Müller 
On the Profitability of Collusion in Location Games FS IV 02 – 22 
Ralph Siebert Learning by Doing and Multiproduction Effects 
over the Life Cycle: Evidence from the 
Semiconductor Industry 
FS IV 02 – 23 
Jürgen Bracht 
Saul Lach 
Eyal Winter 
Modeling Oligopolistic Price Adjustment in Micro 
Level Panel Data 
FS IV 02 – 24 
Steffen Huck 
Kai A. Konrad 
Strategic Trade Policy and the Home Bias in Firm 
Ownership Structure 
FS IV 02 – 25 
Daniel Krähmer Delegation versus Authority FS IV 02 – 26 
Thomas Knaus 
Robert Nuscheler 
Incomplete Risk Adjustment and Adverse 
Selection in the German Public Health Insurance 
System 
FS IV 02 – 27 
Kurt R. Brekke 
Robert Nuscheler 
Odd Rune Straume 
Quality and Location Choices under Price 
Regulation 
FS IV 02 – 28 
Kai A. Konrad Inverse Campaigning FS IV 02 – 29 
Sebastian Kessing A Note on the Determinants of Labour Share 
Movements 
FS IV 02 – 30 
Sebastian Kessing Employment Protection and Product Market 
Competition 
FS IV 02 – 31 
Michal Grajek Identification of Network Externalities in Markets 
for Non-Durables 
FS IV 02 – 32 
Robert M. Adams 
Lars-Hendrik Röller 
Robin C. Sickles 
Market Power in Outputs and Inputs:  An Empirical 
Application to Banking 
FS IV 02 – 33 
Tomaso Duso 
Damien J. Neven 
Lars-Hendrik Röller 
The Political Economy of European Merger 
Control:  Evidence using Stock Market Data 
FS IV 02 – 34 
Tomaso Duso 
Astrid Jung 
Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: 
Evidence from the U.S. Mobile 
Telecommunications Industry 
FS IV 02 – 35 
Bei Ihren Bestellungen von WZB-Papers schicken 
Sie bitte unbedingt einen an Sie adressierten Auf-
kleber mit sowie je paper eine Briefmarke im Wert 
von 0,51 Euro oder einen "Coupon Reponse Inter-
national " (für Besteller aus dem Ausland) 
 Please send a self addressed label and postage 
stamps in the amount of 0.51 Euro or a "Coupon- 
Reponse International" (if you are ordering from 
outside Germany) for each WZB-paper requested 
 
Bestellschein Order Form 
 
 
 
 
Absender / Return Address: 
 
 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 
für Sozialforschung 
Presse- und informationsreferat 
Reichpietschufer 50 
 
D-10785 Berlin-Tiergarten  
 
 
 
Hiermit bestelle ich folgende(s) 
Discussion paper(s): 
 
 
 
Please send me the following 
Discussion paper(s): 
Bestell-Nr. / Order no. Autor/in, Kurztitel /Author(s) / Title(s) in brief 
  
 
